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NOTES
PICKING ON PICKERING: PROPOSING
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY IN PUBLICEMPLOYEE RELIGIOUS-SPEECH CASES
VIA BERRY V. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES
The tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
of the First Amendment is ongoing and well documented.' This
tension becomes particularly apparent when a government employee
expresses her religious views in the workplace. In these cases, the
government employer must beware of a free exercise or free speech
violation if it restricts the employee's expression and of an
establishment violation if it permits the speech. Public-employee
speech cases, absent any free exercise issues, are traditionally
examined under the Supreme Court's test announced in Pickering v.
Board of Education,2 which weighs the employee's interest "as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees.", 3 Interesting
and difficult questions arise, however, when the employee's speech is

' The relevant portion of the First Amendment reads, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
2 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
3 Id. at 568. The text of Pickering limits the balancing test to teachers, but the Court has
readily expanded the test to encompass government employees generally. See, e.g., City of San
Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (applying the Pickering test to a police officer's
expression).
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religious in nature, and the proper analysis of this type of publicemployee speech forms the subject of this Note.
In the 2006 case of Berry v. Department of Social Services,4 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied in part on
Pickering to uphold restrictions placed on the religious expression of
a government employee. The court's decision in Berry provides a
useful starting point to consider the best judicial approach to
government employees' religious expression because of the variety of
factual situations presented in the case. The plaintiff, Daniel Berry,
argued that his employer, the Department of Social Services of
Tehama County, California, should have allowed him to place a Bible
on his desk, speak with clients about religion, and hold religious
meetings in an office conference room.5 Rather than discussing these
scenarios simultaneously, the Ninth Circuit looked at the three factual
situations independently, with its analysis for each differing slightly.6
By examining the court's discussion, this Note considers whether the
Pickering balancing test is an appropriate standard where publicemployee speech is enmeshed with religion. If Pickering is not
appropriate, what standard best suits these cases? Will an alternative
analysis significantly alter case outcomes?
These issues are pertinent now because of the increasing presence
of religion in the workplace. The increasing diversity in many offices
and the amount of time individuals devote to work have contributed
to this phenomenon. As some professions have taken more and more
of employees' personal time, employees have begun to take more of
their personal lives, including their religious observance, to work.7 In
the private workplace, this increasing presence of religion and the
restriction thereof may lead to statutory religious discrimination
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 Additional
4 447 F.3d 642 (9th Cir. 2006).

5 Id at 645-47. See also Brief of Appellant at 6-7, Berry v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 447
F.3d 642 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-15566), 2004 WL 2336195, at *6-7.
6 Berry, 447 F.3d at 648-55.
7 See generally Ellen Wulfhorst, Religion FindsFirm Footing in Some Offices, REUTERS,
Dec. 6, 2006, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0531418620061206 (claiming "[t]he growth
of diversity in the workplace, along with the influence of religion in America, has brought
faith-once as taboo in the office as talk of sex and politics-to the job") (last visited Oct. 30,
2007).
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (forbidding an employer from hiring, firing, or
otherwise discriminating "against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin"). Most of the suits that government employees initiate also include claims
under Title VII to accompany their constitutional objections. For a more thorough discussion of
Title VII religious discrimination claims, which this Note does not satisfactorily address, see 3
ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 54.01-56.12 (2d ed.
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constitutional complications arise under the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment when religion is introduced
in the public workplace.
Recent cases arising in the military context are characteristic of the
issues that inevitably arise when a government employer attempts to
manage the religious expression of its employees. In 2004, a dispute
ensued at the Air Force Academy when several evangelical Christians
in leadership positions were accused of "aggressive proselytizing and
discrimination." 9 In addition, controversy has swirled around the
proper role of chaplains in the military. A number of Christian
chaplains filed suit against the Navy, claiming they were dismissed or
denied promotions on the basis of their religious views.' 0 These
disputes reached the halls of Congress when the 2006 National
Defense Authorization Act, which sets military spending levels, was
delayed for several weeks due to debate over a section that would
have allowed chaplains to give sectarian prayers at traditionally
nondenominational military events. 1 Congress eventually eliminated
the provision in a compromise that also rescinded Air Force 12and Navy
guidelines intended to limit proselytizing within the service.
This Note attempts to develop a more systematic framework to
address similar situations, and argues that Pickering has failed as a
standard in public- employee religious-expression cases for two
reasons. First, courts have improperly placed a greater emphasis on
the employer's establishment concerns than on the employee's free
speech and exercise interests, a practice encouraged under a test that
offers no guidance for cases involving religious expression. Second, a
pure balancing test allows a court to state its conclusion about whose
interests are weightier without fully explicating its reasoning. Such
conclusory adjudications give little guidance to prospective plaintiffs
and are, generally speaking, a poor way to dispose of substantial

1994 & Supp. 2007), and Debbie N. Kaminer, When Religious Expression Creates a Hostile
Work Environment: The Challenge of Balancing Competing Fundamental Rights, 4 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 81 (2000).

9 Neela Banejee, Proposal on Military Chaplains and Prayer Holds Up Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A19.
I Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently upheld a
ruling for the Navy on summary judgment in one such suit. The merits of the Chaplain's
constitutional challenges were never confronted, though, as the court held that the Chaplain
lacked standing because his resignation from the Navy was voluntary. Veitch v. England, 471
F.3d 124 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
n Banerjee, supra note 9, at A19.
12Neela Banerjee, Chaplain Prayer Provision Cut from Military Spending Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at A25.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:2

constitutional issues. A standard that fully recognizes the employee's
concerns and forces the court to say something about the logic
supporting its decision would avoid these two pitfalls of Pickering
analysis. This Note proposes intermediate scrutiny as a possible
solution. Under this standard, the government employer would be
required to present an important governmental interest (that is, a
colorable establishment claim) and show that its restriction furthers
that interest without unduly burdening the employee's protected
religious expression. Although this approach may not lead to
dramatically different results in all circumstances, it will force courts
to approach these cases more consistently, to fully consider the
employee's interests, and to refrain from making somewhat arbitrary
decisions.
Part I of this Note provides a survey of the legal background
necessary to analyze public employees' religious expressions. This
first entails a discussion of the Pickering line of cases that address
public-employee speech generally. Next, the Supreme Court's freeexercise precedent is considered, beginning with the landmark
decision of Sherbert v. Verner.'3 Third, this Note addresses the
judicial requirements for asserting a violation of the Establishment
Clause. Part II then presents Berry's three disparate scenarios and
considers the Ninth Circuit's analysis of each. Next, Part III illustrates
Pickering's shortcomings when applied to public-employee religiousexpression cases. Finally, Part IV proposes intermediate scrutiny as
an alternative analysis and considers, in particular, how this
alternative framework would alter the Berry analysis under
Pickering.14
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND: AN OVERVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
FREE SPEECH, FREE EXERCISE, AND ESTABLISHMENT
JURISPRUDENCE

So long as the Supreme Court leaves unidentified the proper
analysis for public-employee religious speech, it will be necessary to
13 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
14 Due to the dense field of literature that discusses the First Amendment rights of
employees, it is necessary to state the limits of this Note at the outset. First, the claims of private
employees fall largely outside the scope of this Note. In a private employment setting, the
analysis would obviously be quite different because the employer would have no Establishment
Clause concerns and the employee would not be entitled to the same constitutional protections
of speech and religion. Second, this Note will not analyze public employees' claims for
religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Instead, the analysis here is
concerned with courts' treatment of public employees' constitutional religious discrimination
claims.
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draw analogies from a variety of existing case law. Public-employee
religious-expression cases generally join together aspects of free
speech, free exercise, and establishment jurisprudence, which5
together provide the setting for a public employee's legal action.'
First, there are the cases, of which Pickering stands most prominently,
that address a public employee's right to free speech in the
workplace. These cases are clearly helpful in analyzing an
employee's expression generally, but the opinions rarely contemplate
the uniquely religious nature of employee speech of concern here.
Therefore, something more is needed to conduct a complete analysis
of these claims. A line of Supreme Court cases addressing free
exercise claims of employees lends a helping hand on this front. This6
complex litany of decisions began in 1963 with Sherbert v. Verner
and runs through Employment Division v. Smith 17 in 1990 and City of
Boerne v. Flores18 in 1997. Finally, the public employer's perspective
is best understood through decisions addressing the Establishment
Clause. This section will address these three lines of cases in turn.
A. The Free Speech Component: Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti
For seventy years, American courts essentially held that
employees, even those working for the government, could be
subjected to any conditions placed on their speech by an employer.' 9
The leading formulation of this rule was McAuliffe v. Mayor of New
Bedford,20 an 1892 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case
resolving a police officer's claim that his department dismissed him
for engaging in "political canvassing," which consisted of
"solicit[ing] votes, aid and assistance from divers [sic] voters of New
Bedford in the interests of certain political parties." Writing for the
15For a brief but useful overview of the competing interests and legal precedents in this
area of law, see generally Peter M. Panken, Religion and the Workplace: Harmonizing Work
and Worship, 1 AL-ABA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. COURSE OF STUDY: ADV. EMP. L. &

LITIG. 71 (2005).
16 374 U.S. 398.
17 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
18 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Congress responded to the decision in Boerne by passing the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat.
803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000)), which is applicable only to instances of land use
for institutionalized persons and prisons that receive federal funds. Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d
559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004).
19 See Sonja Bice, Student Paper, Tough Talk from the Supreme Court on Free Speech:
The Illusory Per Se Rule in Garcetti as Further Evidence of Connick's Unworkable
Employee/Citizen Speech Partition,8 J.L. Soc'Y 45, 51 (2007) (discussing the Supreme Court's
approach to protected speech for public employees).
20 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892), abrogatedby Pereira v. Conmm'r of Soc. Servs., 733 N.E.2d
112, 116-17 (Mass. 2000).
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court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. fashioned the rule by stating
that "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. 21
The Supreme Court revisited the employee speech issue when it
confronted the case of a fired teacher who had written a letter critical
of the Board of Education to a local newspaper.22 The teacher, Marvin
Pickering, wrote the letter in response to what he saw as the Board's
poor handling of proposals to raise revenue.23 After the newspaper
published the letter, the Board held a hearing in which it claimed that
statements made in the letter were false and "unjustifiably impugned"
the school administration.24 Based on this reasoning, the Board
determined that the letter's publication was "detrimental to the
efficient operation and administration of the schools of the district"
and accordingly dismissed Pickering.25 Pickering challenged his
discharge under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
A majority of the Court overturned Pickering's dismissal in an
opinion by Justice Marshall. After a recital of the facts, Marshall
immediately rejected the notion (implicit in the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision) that teachers relinquish some of their constitutional
speech rights when commenting upon matters connected to the public
schools in which they work, stating that such a premise had been
"unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court., 26
The decision proceeded to enunciate a balancing analysis that has
been influential for nearly half a century, requiring a weighing of the
employee's interest to comment on issues of "public concern" and the
employer's need to provide public services efficiently.2 7
While Justice Marshall identified the relevant interests in an
employee speech analysis, the ambiguity inherit in Pickering has
required clarification. The 1983 case of Connick v. Myers28 offered
the Court an opportunity to elaborate on the "public concern"
requirement. Sheila Myers, a New Orleans assistant district attorney,
Id. at 517.
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
23 Id. Mr. Pickering's letter read in part, "As I see it, the bond issue is a fight between the
Board of Education that is trying to push tax-supported athletics down our throats with
education, and a public that has mixed emotions about both of these items because they feel they
are already paying enough taxes, and simply don't know whom to trust with any more tax
money." Id. at 578.
24 Id. at 566-67.
25 Id. at 564.
26 Id. at 568 (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)).
27 Id.
28 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
21
22
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was fired after she circulated a survey to fellow employees; the
survey implicitly questioned the wisdom of her supervisor's decision
to transfer her to a different section of the criminal court.29 She
challenged her dismissal under the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
essentially arguing that her speech was protected because the survey
regarded a matter of public concern. 30 The Court disagreed and
identified a distinction between speech on public concerns and that
"upon matters only of personal interest," which are entitled to
protection only in unusual circumstances.31 Myers' survey did not
pass this threshold requirement because it was simply used to "gather
ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors," as
opposed to publicly evaluating the performance of her office.32 Thus,
Connick raised the bar for employees seeking to challenge detrimental
actions taken by their employer on free speech grounds.
The Court appeared to further heighten the requirements for
employee speech claims in 2006 with another case involving a
disgruntled prosecutor, Garcetti v. Ceballos.33 Ceballos was fired
after writing a memo to his superior recommending dismissal of a
case because he believed a search warrant was improperly procured.34
In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court reasoned that Ceballos
was not speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern as
required by Pickering.35 Rather, he was acting pursuant to his duties
as a prosecutor, and his employer could appropriately discipline him
for those actions. 36 Garcetti, therefore, refined the public-employee
free speech analysis by classifying all speech made pursuant to an
official job duty as beyond the scope of constitutional protection.
B. The FreeExercise Component: Sherbert and the Compelling
Interest Standard
Pickering and its progeny address the free speech aspects of
public-employee speech. However, what about those cases, of
Id. at 141.
Id. at 141-42.
31 Id. at 147.
32 Id. at 148.
33 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). At least one observer has questioned the true impact of
Garcetti. See Bice, supra note 19, at 86 (Bice argues that "courts are finding it possible to read
Garcetti in ways that allow plaintiffs with First Amendment claims to survive summary
judgment even when the speech they assert is protected was job-related. Garcettimay ultimately
have affected far fewer claims than has been hoped or feared.").
34 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1955-56.
35 Id. at 1960.
29

30

36 Id. at 1959-60.
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primary concern here, where the employee's burdened expression is
religious in nature? Does adding religion into the equation require
greater court protection of the employee's interests? 37 Another group
of cases addressing state actions burdening an employee's religious
observance suggests that the answer may be yes.
In 1963, the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner 38 held that a
compelling-interest test was the appropriate analysis when the
government denied a benefit to an employee as the result of her
religious practice. Sherbert involved a Seventh-Day Adventist whose
employer fired her because she refused to work on Saturdays, due to
her religious beliefs. 39 After being unable to find other work for the
same reason, she filed a claim for unemployment compensation.4 °
The state did not grant her benefits, refusing to recognize her
religious observance as "good cause" for unemployment, and she
subsequently brought suit alleging a Free Exercise Clause violation. 41
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan first made it clear that
the disqualification for benefits was a burden on the employee's free
exercise, because it impeded the observance of her religion, even if
indirectly.42 The Court found it impermissible to force a citizen "to
choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. ' 43 Further, "only
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" could justify
such a burden on free exercise rights. Here, the state had not shown
the existence of such an interest. 44 The Court further amplified its
concern for free exercise interests in Thomas v. Review Board of the
37Admittedly, courts have applied Pickering even where the speech at issue was religious
in nature. See, e.g., Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 658 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that
Pickering "dealt with free speech rather than the free exercise of religion, but because the
analogy is such a close one, and because we see no essential relevant differences between those
rights, we shall endeavor to apply the principles of Pickeringto the case at hand"). Courts have
also applied the balancing test to a number of other types of employee claims. See Brian
Richards, Note, The Boundaries of Religious Speech in the Government Workplace, 1 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 745, 759 & nn.83-86 (1998) (offering precedent where courts have applied
Pickering to expressive association, intimate association, the right to petition, and Fourteenth
Amendment privacy claims).
38 374 U.S. 398 (1963). For a discussion of Sherbert and its broader context, see LEO
PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION 330-37 (1975).
39Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399.
40Id.at 399-401.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 403-04 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)).
43 Jd.at 404.

" Id.at 406-07 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)) (finding South
Carolina's concern with fraudulent unemployment claims unpersuasive and, in any case,
inapposite since the state has not raised these concerns below).
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Indiana Employment Security Division,45 by demanding the state
make an additional showing that its requirement is the "least
restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest."
Sherbert's requirement of a "paramount interest" to justify any
burden on a citizen's religious exercise has stood for the past forty
years, although it has been infrequently invoked. The Supreme
Court's use of Sherbert in particular has been largely limited to
unemployment compensation cases. In the few instances it has been
referenced in other contexts, the Court has found that the state
satisfied the test.46 This limited application, however, should not

undermine the principle at the heart of Sherbert and compelling
interest analysis generally-namely, that limitations placed upon
fundamental constitutional rights, such as free exercise under the First
Amendment, are deserving of the most exacting judicial scrutiny.
Nearly thirty years after Sherbert, the Supreme Court conducted an
extensive review of its free exercise jurisprudence in Employment
Division v. Smith.4 7 Smith addressed the denial of government

benefits to a group of American Indians who were fired pursuant to a
controlled substance law when they used peyote as part of their
religious practice. 48 The case is relevant here for two reasons. First,
Smith rejected the compelling interest test where "a valid and neutral
law of general applicability" incidentally impeded an individual's
right to free exercise. 49 Therefore, Smith would not seem to preclude
the compelling interest analysis in cases where the government takes
action independent of any general law, as in Berry.50 Second, the
Court suggested it would be more inclined to remove a burden on
religion in cases where protected religious activity is coupled with
other constitutionally protected interests, such as free speech.51 This
45 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
46 For unemployment cases where the Court utilized Sherbert to invalidate state
unemployment compensation rules that would have required applicants to work in violation of
their religious tenets, see Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987), and
Thomas, 450 U.S. 707. For cases in other contexts where the Court found the compellinginterest test satisfied, see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), and Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
47 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
48 Id. at 874.
49 Id. at 879 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
50Berry made this point in his brief to the Ninth Circuit, apparently with little effect. See
Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 10.
51Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. The Court went on to cite a series of cases where such
"hybrid rights" were present:
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940) (invalidating a licensing system for
religious and charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to deny a
license to any cause he deemed nonreligious); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)
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idea of "hybrid rights" protection was clearly dicta in Smith, and
many courts confronted with "hybrid" situations have treated it as
such.5 2 Nevertheless, it provides some support for analyzing religious
speech by public employees on a higher plane than non-religious or
political speech.
C. The EstablishmentComponent: A Public Employer's Concern with
EndorsingReligion
A public employee's free exercise claim inevitably gives rise to
countervailing considerations of whether the employer violated the
Establishment Clause. Even where a court does not explicitly decide
whether an establishment violation exists, facts giving rise to a
possible violation could be a strong factor in the outcome of an
employee's free exercise claim. Significantly, courts applying the
Pickering analysis to public-employee religious speech have at times
cited establishment concerns to help fulfill the employer-efficiency
side of the balancing equation and validate the limitation on the
employee's speech. 3 With this in mind, it is critical to understand the
parameters of establishment analysis to properly analyze publicemployee religious-expression cases.
The Supreme Court's modem establishment jurisprudence
generally traces to Lemon v. Kurtzman.54 In determining that a state
statute improperly provided aid to religious schools, the Lemon Court
first identified "three main evils" intended to be avoided by operation
of the Establishment Clause: the state sponsoring religion, providing
financial support of religion, and being actively involved in religious

(invalidating a flat tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); . . .
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating compulsory school-attendance laws as
applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school).
Id. at 881.
52 See, e.g., Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001)
("[Smith's] language relating to hybrid claims is dicta and not binding on this court."). See also
Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a "Rule" Doesn't Rule: The Failure of the Oregon
Employment Division v. Smith "HybridRights Exception ", 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 573 (2003);
Ryan M. Akers, Begging the High Courtfor Clarification: Hybrid Rights Under Employment
Division v. Smith, 17 REGENT U. L. REv. 77 (2004).
53 See, e.g., Berry v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 650-51 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
that the employer's need to avoid an Establishment Clause violation outweighed the burden
placed on Berry's religious exercise by not allowing him to speak with clients about his
religion); Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
a school district's establishment concerns outweighed a teacher's interest in talking to students
about religion).
54 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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activity. 55 To avoid these pitfalls, the Court continued, the
government action at issue must pass three tests: (1) it must have a
secular legislative purpose, (2) its primary effect must not advance or
inhibit religion, and (3) it must not encourage "an excessive
government entanglement with religion. 56
This elementary "Lemon test" has formed the bedrock of
establishment jurisprudence ever since its inception, although its
application has been inconsistent and even contradictory at times.5 7
Scholars have noted, and the cases below illustrate, that the Supreme
Court's application of Lemon has varied greatly, with the Court
sometimes strictly following its terms, sometimes using it as a
"signpost," and sometimes completely ignoring or discarding it.5 8
Further, a number of Supreme Court justices have, at times,
advocated abandoning Lemon in favor of a "coercion" test that would
ask only whether an individual faced compelled religious observance
at the hands of the government. 9 The uncertainty surrounding
modem establishment doctrine will obviously make it more difficult
for a government employer to determine when an employee's
religious expression runs afoul of the Establishment Clause.
One interesting line of Establishment Clause cases that bears on
public-employee expression involves the display of religious symbols
on government property. 6° Two recent public-display cases regarding
the placement of Ten Commandment monuments on government
grounds shed light on the Supreme Court's current view of the
Establishment Clause. In the first of these cases, McCreary County v.
ACLU,61 the Court resolved a dispute stemming from the erection of
Ten Commandment statues in two Kentucky county courthouses. The
displays originally stood alone, but after the ACLU brought suit, each
county authorized a second, extended display placing the
Commandments with eight other documents intended to illustrate
55 Id.at 612.

Id.at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
57See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 419 (1998) (offering conflicting case
examples from the Tenth Circuit, which found in Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226
(10th Cir. 1995), that a Christian Cross in a city seal violated the Establishment Clause, but held
in Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214 (10th Cir. 1996), that statutes requiring "In God We
Trust" to be printed on money met the Lemon requirements).
58 William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and
Establishment,59 S.CAL. L. REv. 495, 497 (1986).
59 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-64 (1989) (5-4 decision)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
60 One can see the logical analogy between a public employee placing a Bible on his desk
in view of the public and the state placing a statue depicting the Ten Commandments in their
courthouse. See infra Part IV.B.2.
61 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
56

524
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Kentucky's legal history. 2 The Court made a point of examining the
counties' purposes in ruling that the displays violated the
Establishment Clause.6 3 Basing its analysis on the "secular purpose"
prong of Lemon, the Court stated, "When the government acts with
the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it
violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious
neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government's ostensible
object is to take sides." 64
On the same day it decided McCreary County, the Supreme Court
ruled that the placement of a Ten Commandments monument on the
grounds of the Texas State Capitol passed Establishment Clause
muster in Van Orden v. Perry.65 A telling difference here was the
placement of the Commandments among seventeen other monuments
and twenty-one historical markers, rather than standing alone in a
high-traffic public area.66 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the
majority that the Lemon test was not useful in dealing with such a
"passive monument" and instead decided the case by looking to "the
nature of the monument and.. . our Nation's history." 67 Perhaps this
passive/active distinction can be helpful in determining when a public
employer has a legitimate establishment concern over the religious
expression of its employees.
A number of establishment cases at the circuit court level have
addressed concerns involving public employment. Public schools are
the most typical setting in which these cases arise, with the typical
fact pattern depicting an individual subjected to religious invocation
at a mandatory event who subsequently objects under the
Establishment Clause. Generally, courts have held that this sort of
forced observance violates the Constitution's guarantee of
government neutrality, with Lee v. Weisman68 the leading case for this
proposition. For example, a 2004 case from the Eighth Circuit held
that prayers at mandatory teacher conferences constituted an

62
63

Id. at 850.

Id. at 859-62 (stating that "scrutinizing purpose does make practical sense, as in
Establishment Clause analysis, where an understanding of official objective emerges from
readily discoverable fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter's heart of hearts").
6 Id. at 860 (citing Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)).
65 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
SId. at 681.
67 Id. at 686.
- 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that prayers offered at an official school graduation
ceremony violated the Establishment Clause).
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establishment violation, regardless of whether the69prayer had any
offensive effect on the individual bringing the claim.
On occasion, individuals have resorted to the Establishment Clause
to defend against government action they believe treated their
exercise of religion in a uniquely disparaging manner. In one such
case, a Colorado teacher claimed his school district violated the
Establishment Clause when it removed two Christian books from his
classroom library, ordered the teacher not to read from the Bible or
keep it on his desk during school hours, and removed the Bible from
the school's library. 70 The Tenth Circuit, however, determined that
the primary effect of the district's actions was not disapproval of
Christianity, but was the disapproval of any classroom activity
promoting a particular religion, and, therefore, found no breach of the
Establishment Clause. 7'
The foregoing discussion of public-employee speech, free
exercise, and establishment jurisprudence presents the fundamental
tenets of each doctrine to illustrate the precepts that should be a
foremost consideration in any case involving the religious expression
of a public employee. Unfortunately, because the Supreme Court has
offered little direction regarding the proper approach to such cases,
lower courts have often ignored some of this relevant precedent. The
next part of this Note will analyze the Ninth Circuit's most recent
attempt to navigate a public-employee religious-expression case.
II. BERRY V. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES AND PICKERING'S
PREEMINENCE

Daniel Berry was employed as a social worker for the Tehama
County Department of Social Services starting in 1991.72 Beginning
in 1997, his duties included assisting clients in their transition from
welfare programs to employment.7 3 This role required Berry to meet
with and counsel many individuals in his office cubicle. 74 When he
undertook this position, the department informed Berry that he could
not discuss religion with clients or workers from other agencies.75
Berry, an evangelical Christian with sincere religious beliefs, was
uncomfortable complying with this rule and promptly asked his
Warnock v. Archer, 380 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 2004).
Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1053 (10th Cir. 1990).
11 Id. at 1059.
72 Berry v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 2006).
69
70

73 Id.

74 Id.
73 Id.
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supervisors to be relieved
from it, but the department refused to
76
deviate from its policy.
In January 2001, Berry organized a voluntary lunch time prayer
meeting for employees to be held in the "Red Bluff Room," a
conference room within the department's offices, once a month."
After being denied access to the room by the department's director,
he continued to hold the meetings without scheduling them. The
director then sent Berry a letter, reiterating that he was not to use the
room for his prayer meeting, essentially because the prayer group's
use of78 it would require the department to open the room to any
group.

Another of Berry's complaints stemmed from his desire to
decorate his cubicle with religious paraphernalia. The department
denied his request to do so, but he placed a Bible on his desk and
hung a "Happy Birthday, Jesus" sign anyway after contacting a civil
rights organization that told him that such postings were legal. Berry
ultimately complied with the department's request to remove the sign
and keep his Bible out of view, after receiving a letter of reprimand in
December 200 1.
Following this letter, however, Berry filed a complaint with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and
subsequently filed suit in federal court when he received a "right to
sue letter" from the EEOC. 80 His suit sought declarative and
injunctive relief, alleging that the department was obliged to allow
him to exercise his religion by speaking with clients when they
indicated a willingness to discuss religion, holding prayer meetings in
the conference room, and displaying religious articles at his desk.8'
Berry and the department filed cross-motions for summary judgment
at the district court. 82 The court granted the department's motion, and
Berry appealed.83
A. The Ninth CircuitApplies Pickering
After a thorough discussion of the facts, the Ninth Circuit chose to
address each of Berry's three complaints in turn. First was his
76

Id.

77 Id.
78

Berry, 447 F.3d at 646-47 & n.l.

79 Id. at 647 & n.2.

go d. at 647-48.
81 Id. at 648.
82

Id.

83 Id.
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contention that the department must allow him to discuss religion
with his clients. Before it was able to address the substance of this
claim, however, the court had to determine the proper analytical
framework-specifically, whether or not to extend Pickeringto a case
of public-employee religious speech.
In his brief to the Ninth Circuit, Berry argued that the court should
apply strict scrutiny to his claims, because his speech incorporated
both free speech and free exercise concerns.84 In support of this
contention, he emphasized the Supreme Court's statement in
Pickeringthat it "was not attempting to 'lay down a general standard
against which all statements . . .[public employees make] may be

judged."'' 85 Rather, the Court pointed out that the variety of factual
situations involving public-employee speech may call for a different
analysis, and the test it enunciated was simply "some of the general
lines along which an analysis of the controlling interests should
run.''86 Berry went on to cite Brown v. Polk County," a 1995 Eighth
Circuit case, to support this proposition. Although the Brown court
utilized the Pickering standard to analyze a public employee's free
exercise claim, Brown highlighted the fact that Pickering itself did not
involve speech with religious content.88
Berry also looked to Employment Division v. Smith to support his
argument for strict scrutiny. He first pointed out that, unlike Smith,
the restriction on his speech was not pursuant to a general law, but
rather was "directed purposefully to control the content and viewpoint
of [his] speech., 8 9 Berry also put much weight upon the Court's
"hybrid rights" reference in Smith, since the department was
infringing upon both his right to free speech and his right to free
exercise simultaneously. 90
The Ninth Circuit made short work of Berry's arguments and
decided that Pickering was the proper analytical framework. In its
discussion, the court pointed repeatedly to a 2004 Supreme Court
case, City of San Diego v. Roe,91 to emphasize that the Court has
continued to apply Pickering's balancing test to public-employeespeech claims.92 In Roe, a police officer sued his police department
Brief of Appellant, supranote 5, at 8.
Id.(quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968)).
86 Pickering,391 U.S. at 569.
87 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995).
88 Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 9 (citing Brown, 61 F.3d at 658-59).
84
85

89Id.at 10.
90 Id.at 9-10.

91 543 U.S. 77 (2004).
92 Berry, 447 F.3d at 648-49.
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after he was fired for offering sexually-explicit home videos of
himself for sale online. 93 The Court refused to apply Pickering
because the officer's speech did not regard a matter of public concern,
but it nonetheless reaffirmed the balancing test's use in "reconcil[ing]
the employee's right to engage in speech and the government
employer's right to protect its own legitimate interests in performing
its mission. 94
After citing Roe, the Ninth Circuit dismissed Berry's reliance on
Smith's hybrid-rights exception in a footnote. It stated that, first, the
Supreme Court and lower courts have recognized the hybrid
discussion as mere dicta, and, second, the Supreme Court rarely
utilized this alternative strict scrutiny test in public-employment
cases. 95 The court went on to justify its use of Pickering by pointing
to two of its own prior cases, Tucker v. California Department of
Education96 and Peloza v. Capistrano Unified School District,97 both
of which used a balancing test to address public-employee religious
speech.98 In concluding its rationale, the court asserted that the
Pickering test was best suited to address a public employer's concern
with running the gauntlet between violating an employee's rights to
free speech and free exercise and violating the Establishment
Clause
99
expression.
religious
employee's
the
by allowing
B. The Limitations on Berry's Religious Speech with Clients
Having decided to balance Berry's speech interests against the
department's interest in maintaining efficiency, the Ninth Circuit
spent the next few paragraphs determining that the department's
restrictions on Berry's speech with clients were reasonable.' 00 The
court's lone consideration in coming to this conclusion was the
department's concern with an Establishment Clause violation. The
court cited Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District'0 for the proposition that the state's establishment concerns
93 Roe, 543 U.S. at 78.
94 Id. at 82; see also Berry, 447 F.3d at 648.
95 Berry, 447 F.3d at 649 n.5.
96

97 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996).

97 37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994).
98 Berry, 447 F.3d at 650.
99 Id.

100Id. at

650-51.
1o 508 U.S. 384 (1993). Lamb's Chapel involved a statute that denied religious groups
access to public school property. While admitting that the state's concern with avoiding a
violation of the Establishment Clause may constitute a compelling interest, the Court held that
the state's fears in that particular situation were not well founded. Id. at 393-95.
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may constitute a compelling interest. 0 2 It went on to hold that the
department's worries over a possible establishment violation via
Berry's religious speech with clients were well-taken, stating:
The Department's clients seek assistance from Berry in his
capacity as an agent of the state. Accordingly, they may be
motivated to seek ways of ingratiating themselves with Berry,
or conversely, they may seek reasons to explain a perceived
failure to assist them. It follows that any discussion by Berry
of his religion runs a 0 3real danger of entangling the
Department with religion.'
Further, the establishment dangers here were heightened because
Berry admitted that, if left unrestricted, he would share his religion
with clients. 10 4 The apparent gravity of the department's fears led the
court to conclude that they outweighed
the restrictions' infringements
10 5
of Berry's religious speech.
C. Restrictions on Berry's Religious Displays at His Cubicle
The Ninth Circuit once again applied Pickering and reached a
similar conclusion when it addressed Berry's arguments for
displaying a Bible and a "Happy Birthday Jesus" sign at his desk. The
court quoted its earlier decision in Tucker, where it stated that the
government "has a greater interest in controlling what materials are
posted on its property than it does in controlling the speech of the
people who work for it.' 0 6 In Tucker, however, the court found that
the balancing test weighed in favor of the employee in that case
because the posted materials were in non-public areas. Here, on the
other hand, Berry used his cubicle to interview members of the
public, and, therefore, his display could be viewed as the
department's endorsement of religion.'0 7 These fears of an
Establishment Clause violation, the court held, once again0 8justified
the department's restriction on Berry's religious expression.
0

1 2Berry,447

F.3d at 650.
650-51.
1041d, at 651.
103Id. at

1051d.
106Id. (quoting Tucker v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1214 (9th Cir. 1996)).
1
07 Id. at 652.
108Berry, 447 F.3d at 652. While the court did not consider the Supreme Court's public
display cases in its discussion of Berry's religious display, it did mention McCreary County and
Van Orden in a footnote, stating that these decisions lent "some support" to the department's
position. Id. at 652 n.9.
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D. Denial of Conference Room Use for Voluntary PrayerMeetings
The court abandoned its reliance on Pickering and instead utilized
public-forum analysis to examine the department's decision to forbid

Berry from holding prayer meetings in an office conference room.
Under this standard, if the department was found to have opened the

conference room for public use, it would have had very limited ability
to prohibit certain groups from using the room.10 9 Because the court

found that usage of the room for purposes not associated with the
department's business duties was limited to birthday parties and baby

showers, it determined that access to the conference room had been
reserved to a "particular class of speakers," and, thus, it was not a
public forum.110
The court went on to reject Berry's argument that even though the
room was a non-public forum, the department's prohibition on the
prayer group's use of the room was unreasonable. In support of the
reasonableness of the prohibition, the court pointed out that the reason
for the denial of use was viewpoint-neutral and that the department
denied use to other social organizations as well."' The distinction

between business-related social functions and non-business group
meetings was a reasonable line for the department to draw; therefore,
the court concluded that the denial of conference room use for prayer
meetings did not abridge Berry's First Amendment rights."12

III. THE PROBLEMS WITH PICKERING
The preceding discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Berry
is representative of the way courts generally approach publicemployee religious-expression cases. As stated previously, the
Supreme Court has never applied Pickering to a case of public1°9See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995). In
CapitolSquare, the Court states:
If [the property has by law or tradition been given the status of a public forum], a
State's right to limit protected expressive activity is sharply circumscribed: It may
impose reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions ... but it may
regulate expressive content only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly
drawn, to serve a compelling state interest.
Id. (citing Perry Ed. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 47, 45 (1983)). See also
16A Am Jur. 2d, supra note 57, at §§ 517-523 (discussing public forums and place restrictions).
l10 Berry, 447 F.3d at 653 (quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S.
666, 679 (1998)).
11Id at 654.
112
The court concluded its decision by similarly rejecting Berry's Title VII claims for
failure to accommodate and disparate treatment. Id. at 654-57.
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employee religious expression. Faced with this lack of guidance, it
has become commonplace for lower courts to extend Pickering to
these situations. 1 3 This use of the balancing test, however, is not selfevidently correct and is a poor method of protecting the competing
interests at stake. The remainder of this Note will contemplate the
failure of this approach and propose a test that may result in
adjudications that more fully and appropriately weigh the competing
interests at stake. First, this Note will illustrate how courts applying
the balancing test have placed too little emphasis on the employee's
rights and may have even misjudged the employer'sestablishment
concerns. Second, this Note will demonstrate that courts' application
of Pickering has led them in the direction of conclusory statements
rather than thorough analyses, which would offer better guidance to
future courts and parties. Considering these difficulties resulting from
Pickering,this Note will propose an intermediate scrutiny standard as
an alternative and apply this possible solution to the scenarios
presented in Berry.
A. CourtsApplying Pickering Improperly Weigh the Employee's
Interests
The balancing test that the Supreme Court enunciated in Pickering
requires weighing the employee's interests, "as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State," against the employer's interests "inpromoting the efficiency14
of the public services it performs through its employees.""
Attempting to analyze religious expression under this rubric is like
aligning a square peg with a round hole. Without a test that speaks
directly to the free speech, free exercise, and establishment interests
in public-employee religious-speech cases, courts are given too much
freedom to develop makeshift, "modified" Pickeringanalysis that do
not give due credit to the employee's rights and even mischaracterize
the employer's establishment concerns.
To use Berry as an example, this tendency was apparent in the
Ninth Circuit's emphasis on the Establishment Clause, and its
overlooking of the free speech and exercise concerns of the employee.
The court stated that it applies a "slight variation on the Pickering
balancing test" in these cases, but at no point did the court rationalize
how or why its analysis differed from the original terms of
113
Richards, supra note 37, at 749 (stating that the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
circuits have utilized Pickeringto analyze free exercise claims).
114Pickering,391 U.S. at 568.
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Pickering."' After its initial choice to apply Pickering, the court
failed to offer any discussion of the strength or weakness of Berry's
free exercise claims. 1 6 Instead, both in relation to his speech with
clients and his display of religious items, the court simply proceeded
to validate the employer's establishment fears and concluded that "the
Department's need to avoid possible violations of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment outweighs ' 17the restriction's
curtailment of Berry's religious speech on the job.""
The Ninth Circuit's analysis clearly overlooks the stature the
Supreme Court has granted free exercise claims in the past. Under
Sherbert, discussed above, the Supreme Court has applied a rigorous
compelling-interest test in free exercise cases." 8 One may argue, of
course, that this doctrine has been largely limited to unemployment
cases and, therefore, it should only apply in similar situations where
mandatory government-controlled benefits are denied. The Court,
however, has emphasized that the compelling-interest standard hinges
upon the individualized nature of the government action and not on
the denied benefit. It noted in a subsequent decision that "[t]he
Sherbert test, it must be recalled, was developed in a context that lent
itself to individualized
governmental assessment of the reasons for the
119
relevant conduct."
In the public-employment context, an employer's choice to restrict
an employee is an individualized decision. In Berry, this was
particularly true, as there were numerous exchanges between Berry
and department management. 120 Further, although employment at a
government agency is not a mandatory benefit like unemployment
compensation, once a public employer extends employment it is, of
course, mandatory for the employer to abide by its constitutional and
statutory obligations. The factual disparity between cases like
Sherbert and Berry makes it difficult to argue decisively for
application of a compelling-interest standard for public-employee
religious expression, but the similarities between the two strongly
suggest that Pickering'sbalancing is far from adequate.
15Beny,

447 F.3d at 650.

161d, at 648-52.

17Id at 651. This is the court's conclusion as to Berry's speech with clients, but it makes
a similar pronouncement as to his display of religious items, stating, "We conclude that under
the balancing test, the Department's need to avoid an appearance of endorsement of religion
outweighs the curtailment on Berry's ability to display religious items in his cubicle, which is
frequented
by the Department's clients." Id. at 652.
8
1 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
19 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
120Berry, 447 F.3d at 646.
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Smith's hybrid-rights consideration further buttresses this point.
Here, the public employee can viably assert both free speech and free
exercise interests. In Smith, the Court pointed to cases where it had
barred restrictions on religiously motivated action when the free
exercise interest accompanied free speech considerations.' 2' The
Court cited Cantwell v. Connecticut for this proposition, where it
stated that "[t]he fundamental law declares the interest of the United
States that the free exercise of religion be not prohibited and that
' 22
freedom to communicate information and opinion be not abridged.'
Smith, therefore, indicates that public employee's speech and free
exercise rights are entitled to judicial protection beyond that which
Pickeringoffers.
Further, Pickering generally mischaracterizes both the employer's
and the employee's interests. Under Pickering, a court evaluating an
employee's speech must look to whether the expression touches upon
a public concern. The emphasis of the Free Exercise Clause, however,
is not on ensuring the public's receipt of religious ideas, but rather
upon protecting the individual's ability to hold and exercise sincerely
held beliefs. Free exercise scholar Michael W. McConnell, among
others, has promoted this concept while defending the need for
citizens' free exercise rights to stand up to goverunent intrusion in
the public sphere. He has stated the purpose of the religion clauses as
follows:
It is to preserve what Madison called the "full and equal
rights" of religious believers and communities to define their
own way of life, so long as they do not interfere with the
rights of others, and to participate fully and equally with their
fellow citizens in public life without being
forced to shed
23
their religious convictions and character.
Under this view, a test for religious speech that emphasizes the public
nature of the expression, rather than the individual's ability to express
it, seems inappropriate.
Further, a test that looks to an employer's need to promote
efficiency poorly defends the Establishment Clause's purpose. Surely,
121Smith,

494 U.S. at 881.
310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940) (concerning a state statute on breach of the peace).
123Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115,
117 (1992) (footnote omitted). For more of McConnell's view of the Free Exercise Clause, see
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHi. L. REV.
1109 (1990), and Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
'1
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work output will increase marginally if public employees are
forbidden from expressing their religious beliefs in any shape or form
within the workplace, but this point seems irrelevant when weighing
fundamental constitutional rights. 24 A prominent establishment
scholar has stated that the primary concern of the Establishment
Clause is preventing "enshrinement of official religious belief or
exaction of financial support for religion.' 25 Regardless of the extent
to which one believes public employees should be able to express
their religion in the workplace, courts should not premise
establishment determinations on a desire for workplace efficiency.
B. Pickering Results in Conclusory Adjudications by the Courts
The preceding section illustrated how Pickering leads to an
improper weighing of a public employee's constitutional rights. Now
the argument turns away from substance and toward method,
asserting that Pickering's balancing test allows courts to adjudicate
claims in a conclusory manner that offers little guidance for future
courts and parties.
Berry illustrated this tendency through the court's failure to
address the significance of Berry's constitutional rights. With respect
to his speech with clients, the court spent substantial time discussing
the weightiness of the employer's establishment concerns, but then
concluded its analysis in the employer's favor without a word
evaluating the strength of Berry's interests. 126 Similarly, the court
overlooked Berry's rights when it disposed of his claim regarding
religious items in his cubicle. The court spent a single sentence
dismissing his free exercise concerns, stating only that Berry could
keep his Bible hidden and read it when no clients were in his cubicle,
and, once again, concluded that the employer's establishment
concerns were paramount. 127 At no point did the court address Berry's
lengthy arguments in his brief that the department's restrictions
placed too great a28burden on his expression even under the Pickeringbalancing rubric.
124Cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (suggesting
the validity of restrictions on work hours and stating, "[A] constitution is not intended to
embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the
citizen to the State or of laissezfaire").
15Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195, 202
(1992).
126Berry, 447 F.3d at 650-51.
127Id at 652.
128See Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 36-37 (arguing that the state's exclusion of
religious postings while allowing non-religious postings infringed on Berry's First Amendment
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Courts using Pickering in other cases have also conducted such
conclusory examinations. The Ninth Circuit's analysis in Peloza v.
Capistrano Unified School District129 was quite similar to Berry.
When addressing a teacher's free speech and free exercise claim that
he be allowed to discuss religion with students, the court looked only
to the school's establishment fears and silently dismissed the
teacher's contention that the restriction was, nevertheless, an
overbroad infringement on his rights. 130 This sort of cursory
examination is encouraged under a simple balancing standard
that
1 31
standard.
objective
an
meet
to
action
state
require
not
does
Courts should avoid such brief analysis, especially when courts are
deciding substantial constitutional rights. In the public-employment
context, both employers' and employees' future conduct is directed
by the logic courts use to dispose of claims. When courts offer little
reasoning in their decisions, real-world actors are left unsure of the
boundaries governing their behavior. In the constitutional context,
this leads to important rights being overly restricted or too vigorously
pursued. Therefore, an objective standard, which forces courts to
more concretely analyze public-employee religious expression, would
be preferable to the vague, malleable Pickeringstandard.
IV. THE INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY ALTERNATIVE

A. ProposingIntermediateScrutiny as an Alternative to Pickering
The application of intermediate scrutiny in public-employee
religious-expression cases could avoid the problems encountered
under Pickering.The intermediate scrutiny test is generally employed
where government action, "while not facially invidious, nonetheless
give[s] rise to recurring constitutional difficulties."' 132 Under the
classic formulation of intermediate scrutiny, a government regulation
must bear a substantial relationship to an important governmental
free speech and free exercise rights).
129 37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994).
130Id. at 522.
131This Note does not argue that Pickering inevitably leads to courts to conduct conclusory
analyses; instead it argues that such analyses are more likely to occur under an amorphous
balancing test than under an objective standard, such as intermediate scrutiny. Certain courts
have conducted a plodding, deliberate examination even under Pickering. See, e.g., Kukla v.
Village of Antioch, 647 F. Supp. 799 (N.D. I11.
1986) (applying a thorough analysis under
Pickering
to an intimate association claim).
32
1 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982) (holding that the state did not present a
substantial state interest to warrant denying illegal aliens free public education).
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interest and be narrowly drawn to serve that interest. 33 When the
Supreme Court established the test, it stated two criteria for whether
government action passed muster under intermediate scrutiny. First,
the action must directly support the government interest. A regulation
that only incidentally supports the government interest will not
survive. 134 Second, if a more limited restriction would serve the
government interest as1 35well as the restriction put in place, the
regulation cannot stand.
While these criteria require courts to be more precise than under a
balancing test, intermediate scrutiny still allows courts flexibility to
address variant factual situations with different levels of intensity.
The Supreme Court has demonstrated this; in certain cases, the test
has looked much like rational-basis review and in others it has
approximated strict scrutiny. In United States v. Virginia,'36 for
example, the Court utilized a form of intermediate scrutiny that
looked very much like strict scrutiny. There, the Court found that
Virginia had not provided an "exceedingly persuasive justification"
for its sex-based admission policy to the all-male
Virginia Military
137
Institute, and, therefore, the restriction failed.
Intermediate scrutiny is appropriate to apply to a public-employee
religious-expression case because an employer's restriction, while not
facially invidious (since it is likely intended to avoid an
Establishment Clause violation), could nonetheless encounter
constitutional difficulties in the form of the employee's free speech
and free exercise rights. Further, by placing several objective
requirements on the restriction, intermediate scrutiny prevents
Establishment Clause concerns alone from being enough to allow the
restriction to proceed. Under Pickering, an employer's hypothetical
establishment claim could lead a court to conclude that the
employer's interests outweigh the employee's without any
consideration of the employee's rights. By contrast, under
intermediate scrutiny, such a result would be inappropriate if the
restriction did not directly lead to an avoidance of the establishment
violation, or if a more limited restriction would serve the purpose
equally as well. In addition, these requirements would force courts to
undergo a more thorough evaluation of the employee's desired
133E.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Conm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
134Id.
135Id.
136518 U.S.

515 (1996).

137d at 555-56.
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religious exercise to determine whether the employer's restriction
overburdens the expression. Finally, intermediate scrutiny does not tie
a court's hands the way a more rigorous or precise form of analysis
might, so a court can still be more or less deferential to the
government action if unique fact patterns so require.
Although intermediate scrutiny should lead to better court analysis,
it is unclear whether it will produce greatly different dispositions than
the Pickering test. The upcoming section will apply intermediate
scrutiny to the two Berry scenarios where the Ninth Circuit applied
Pickering.138
B. Applying IntermediateScrutiny to Religious Speech with Clients
The first restriction the department placed on Berry's activities
was a bar on his religious speech with clients. 139 The department's
claimed interest was that Berry's speech would have produced an
Establishment Clause violation. 140 The Supreme Court has held that
establishment fears may be a compelling interest;' 4' however,
the
42
establishment fears must be legitimate to be recognized. 1
The department's establishment fears in Berry were quite justified.
If the court had applied the classic Lemon test, Berry's religious
speech would likely have produced a violation. First, Berry's speech
would have little if any secular purpose. Berry could argue that, in
certain situations, his invocation of religion could serve the secular
purposes of reassuring or comforting a distraught client. Even in these
circumstances, however, the secular purposes would only be
incidental to the primary purpose of advancing religion. Second, these
same considerations would lead to the conclusion that the primary
effect of Berry's religious speech would be to advance religion.
Third, the department could even make an argument that Berry's
speech would result in too much government involvement with
religion. 43 This would be the most difficult argument for the
138The

court did not analyze use of the conference room under Pickering.Berry, 447 F.3d

at 653.
139Id. at 646.
140Id. at
41

650.

1 E.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981) (stating that a University's interest

in prohibiting religious speech may be compelling).
142 1d. at 271-73 (finding that there was no compelling interest in the regulation where
there was no probable Establishment Clause violation under the Lemon doctrine).
43
1 The excessive entanglement prong of Lemon is primarily concerned with degrees and,
for that reason, is often difficult to apply. Some amount of intermingling between government
and religion is unavoidable, but the question remains where courts should draw the line between
a permissible government accommodation of religion and an impermissible establishment of
religion. See, e.g., Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:2

department, but based on Berry's position as the gateway to the
distribution of government benefits, a client could believe that
conformity with Berry's religious beliefs would be helpful in
receiving government aid. This argument would likely turn on how
the discussion of religion came about. A court would be more likely
to find excessive entanglement if Berry initiated the discussion of
religion prior to or during the application process, as opposed to a
client-initiated discussion. In any event, Berry's religious speech
almost inevitably constitutes an establishment violation under
traditional doctrine since the department need only prove a breach of
one Lemon prong.
While the Ninth Circuit ended its analysis here, an intermediatescrutiny standard would force the court to go further. Even though the
department asserted a colorable important government interest, it
must still demonstrate that the restriction directly supported that
interest and that no lesser restriction would suffice. The first
requirement is straightforward, as the department's ban on Berry's
speech would eliminate any concern over an Establishment Clause
violation. Berry can make an argument, however, that a lesser
restriction would suffice in preempting any violation. For example, a
situation where a religious client began discussing religion and Berry
responded merely by having a general conversation on the matter,
rather than advocating or dismissing any particular religion, would
likely not breach the Establishment Clause. Therefore, a departmental
rule dictating the particular ways Berry could speak about religion
with clients would be a less-restrictive way of ensuring that the
department did not violate the Constitution. Such a rule, however,
would be impractical and nearly impossible to draft. The ways that
religion could arise in Berry's conversations with clients are infinite,
and any department effort to navigate a constitutional course through
the variety of circumstances would be futile. Berry's argument must
fail for this reason. So, in respect to Berry's religious speech with
clients, intermediate scrutiny and Pickering would reach the same
result. Yet, by confronting the lesser-sufficient-restriction
requirement, a court would deal with Berry's interests more
deliberately than did the Ninth Circuit.

1995) (finding excessive entanglement where a city ordinance required regulation of kosher
food for the purpose of fraud prevention). See also 16A AM JUR. 2d, supra note 57, at § 419
(describing the ambiguity of the entanglement rule).
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C. Applying IntermediateScrutiny to Religious Items in a Cubicle
The department's asserted interest of a possible Establishment
Clause violation is less persuasive in regards to the religious items in
Berry's cubicle. Under Lemon, however, the department could still
make out an establishment violation under either the secular-purpose
or primary-effect tests. The only purpose of a "Happy Birthday,
Jesus" sign is undoubtedly the advancement and celebration of
religion. Similarly, its primary effect is to share a religious
celebration with others observing the sign. While Berry can make a
convincing argument here that his benign display of religious objects
does not excessively entangle the department with religion, the
display is a clear violation under the secular-purpose and primaryeffect prongs.
Berry could make a forceful argument, though, that Lemon is not
the appropriate establishment doctrine to apply in this situation.
Rather, he could claim that the religious items in his cubicle were
public displays because they were inanimate objects on government
property that were regularly viewed by the public (i.e., Berry's
clients). Under the Supreme Court's public-display doctrine, Berry
can emphasize Chief Justice Rehnquist's distinction between passive
and active displays developed in Van Orden v. Perry.144 Berry's
religious displays may be passive because they were not in a hightraffic public area, which is one factor the court considered in Van
Orden.145 Berry's displays stood alone, however, whereas the
monument in Van Orden was among numerous other non-religious
items. 46 This fact would tend toward an "active" designation and the
court simply applying Lemon.
On the other hand, the court would have only looked to the nature
of the items if it found they were essentially passive. 147 A distinction
exists here between the "Happy Birthday, Jesus" sign and the Bible.
Berry surely intended the birthday sign to be a public announcement
celebrating a particular religion. As such, the sign's nature would
seem to create an establishment violation since it was posted on
government property. The nature of Berry's Bible, however, was
much more benign. The Bible was Berry's personal property,
144545 U.S. at 686 (holding that the placement of a Ten Commandments monument on the
grounds of the state capitol did not violate the establishment clause). See also supranotes 65-67
and accompanying text.
145Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681.

1461d.
147Id. at 686.
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religious in nature but not announcing any concrete, religious
message. Further, absent any specific reference or use by Berry while
speaking with clients, it likely had very little coercive effect.
Therefore, if the court had applied a passive display standard to
Berry's religious items, the department's establishment fears as to the
Bible were likely erroneous.
If the court found that the department's establishment concerns
were legitimate, it would next consider whether the ban directly
addressed the establishment problems and whether there were any
less-restrictive measures sufficient to avoid establishment difficulties.
Once again, the ban clearly eliminated any establishment concerns by
forcing Berry to put away his Bible and sign. The department could
have, however, banned only the sign and likely still avoided an
establishment violation. The primary purpose of Berry's placement of
a Bible on his desk, presumably along with numerous other items of a
non-religious nature, was not to promote his religion but simply to
have an important item of personal property nearby. Without Berry
actively using it while with clients, the Bible seems to be far from
causing excessive government entanglement with religion.
Additionally, the three establishment evils identified in Lemon-state
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement with
religion-are in no way implicated through Berry placing a Bible on
his desk. Therefore, under an intermediate-scrutiny standard, the
department would be required to more-narrowly craft its restriction on
Berry's rights, and, thus, the alternative analysis would produce a
different outcome in this situation.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's application of the Pickering test in Berry
illustrates two difficulties with the application of a balancing test to
public-employee religious-expression cases. First, a balancing test
offers little direction for the competing interests at stake and,
therefore, leads to an inadequate weighing of the employee's speech
and exercise rights. Second, a balancing test also allows courts to
make conclusory adjudications of these cases.
Intermediate scrutiny avoids these pitfalls by placing requirements
upon the employer's establishment fears and compelling courts to
conduct a more-thorough analysis. By applying intermediate scrutiny
to the Berry facts, this Note illustrates that this alternative doctrine
would lead to a better recognition of the employee's interests and
alter outcomes in some circumstances. Faced with the continuing
absence of Supreme Court doctrine on public-employee religious-
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expression, lower courts should consider applying intermediate
scrutiny to these cases rather than Pickering. Intermediate scrutiny
would likely lead to proper recognition of the divergent constitutional
rights at issue and would ensure more consistent dispositions in
public-employee religious-expression cases.
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